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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Respondents' statement of the case. 
1. Nature of this case: 
This is a proceeding to set-aside inter vivos deeds, brought by the personal 
representative in conjunction with the probate of the grantor's intestate estate. The 
personal representative appeals from a summary judgment upholding the deeds. 
2. Undisputed facts: 
Richard Enriquez Ortega (hereinafter referred to as "Decedent") died intestate on 
November 13, 2009, leaving behind three natural children, including Petitioner/Appellant 
Danielle Quemada (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner"); two ex-wives, Petitioner's 
mother Elizabeth Ortega and Respondents' mother Celia Ortega (hereinafter referred to 
as "Celia"); and two step-sons, Respondents Gilbert Acosta, Jr., and Efren Arizmendez 
(collectively referred to as "Respondents"). Decedent had moved to Idaho from 
California with his then-wife Celia in 2004 or 2005, leaving his first ex-wife and natural 
children behind. 
In the year before he died, Decedent quit-claimed his Homedale residence 
("Richard's House") to Respondent Acosta. That property was encumbered by a deed of 
trust securing payment of a loan to U.S. Bank. The deed was signed by Decedent and 
Celia on December 30, 2008, and duly delivered and recorded. At the same time, Celia 
quit-claimed her residence (the "EI Paso Road property") (along with other properties) to 
Respondent Acosta. That deed was also duly delivered and recorded. Respondent Acosta 
subsequently quit-claimed Richard's House to Respondent Arizmendez, who holds it in 
trust for his minor daughter (referred to hereinafter as Decedent's granddaughter). 
Decedent and Celia separated in 1999 or 2000 but continued a relationship. They 
divorced in June, 2009. 
Decedent continued to live in Richard's House until he died. 
3. Proceedings below: 
Respondent Arizmendez paid Decedent's funeral expenses and started probate 
proceedings as a creditor, sending notice to Decedent's natural children including 
Petitioner. Upon her demand, Respondent Arizmendez resigned as Personal 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page-5 
Representative of Decedent's probate estate in favor of Petitioner. Petitioner then 
attacked the quitclaim deeds for both Richard's House and the El Paso Road property and 
sought damages. She expressly invoked the provisions of the Idaho Trust and Estate 
Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). 
Respondent Arizmendez, later joined by Respondent Acosta, contested 
Petitioner's attack on the two deeds. First, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss under 
IRCP Rule 12(b). That motion was resolved by Petitioner in effect abandoning her claim 
for "damages according to proof' and proceeding only to attempt to set aside the two 
deeds (and incidental damages related to storage costs for Decedent's personal property). 
Petitioner's theories were that the deeds had been procured by fraud or undue influence 
and therefore should be set-aside. Respondents moved for summary judgment. 
The summary judgment was fully briefed and argued. Respondents filed affidavits 
in support and Petitioner filed affidavits in opposition, and cited transcripts of ex parte 
testimony of Respondent Acosta (before he appeared in the case) and Celia given 
pursuant to ex parte orders to appear. Respondent objected to the use ofthe transcripts, 
inter alia, because they were filed late (after the summary judgment motion was argued), 
Motion to Strike/Reply to Supplemental Brief, filed April 11, 20111. 
B. Petitioner's statement of the case is erroroneous. 
1. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 20 does not state that Richard died on November 13,2009, albeit he 
did. 
2. R. Vol. I, p. 31, L. 8 does not state that Richard was single or name his children. 
3. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L. 12-14; p. 87, L. 2-3 does not support fully the statement that 
"Sometime in 2008, Celia began having financial troubles and informed Richard that in 
order to protect ... (etc.)." The evidence is inadmissible double hearsay, even if true, being 
alleged statements of Celia (a non-party) allegedly restated by Decedent to Petitioner's 
affiant. 
4. It is not true that it is undisputed nor does any admissible evidence show that 
Decedent's intent was "to allow each party [sic] to own their own house outright." R. 
1 This paper is part of Respondents' motion to augment record and does not yet have an assigned Record 
page number. 
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Vol. I, p. 87, L. 3-4 does not say that, nor does Tr. Celia Ortega, P. 13, L. 20-25; p. 14, L. 
10-12; p. 16, L. 1-4; or Tr. Gilbert Acosta, p. 15,1. 13-14. 
5. It is not true that the record shows that the El Paso Road property and Richard's House 
were transferred to Gilbert so that he could "manage" them, as Petitioner implies from Tr. 
Celia Ortega, p. 12, L. 1-13. That reference was to other, rental property. Please see, e.g., 
id., p. 11, L. 1- p.l2, 1. 13. The record cited, Tr. Gilbert Acosta, p. 21, L1. 11-19, does 
not support Petitioner's assertion that "Gilbert was unaware of such an intent." 
6. The record cited, Tr. Celia Ortega, p. 21, LL. 7-10, does not support the assertion that 
Celia admitted she prepared the quitclaim deeds. Rather what that passage says is that 
"We prepared them: they, with the help of the, the office there in Title One". Id. "We" in 
this reference clearly means Respondent Acosta, Decedent and Celia. Id., p. 21, L1. 4-6. 
7. There is no admissible evidence, nor is there any reference made to the record to 
support Petitioner's assertion that Decedent did not receive independent advice nor that 
he would not have agreed to the transaction had he received independent advice. App. 
Brief, p. 4, last paragraph. 
8. Tr. Gilbert Acosta, p. 8, LL. 7-9; p. 10, L. 12-14, does not support Petitioner's 
assertion that Decedent and Celia were close (only that Decedent and Respondent Acosta 
were close). 
9. It is not true that Decedent received no "consideration" for his deed, and the record 
cited, Tr. Gilbert Acosta, p. 22, L1. 8-11, in fact establishes that he did: 
Id. 
Q. [W]hat did he get in exchange for giving her[sic] these properties? 
A. He, to this day, he got his wish fulfilled. He wanted his house in case 
something happened to him, to go to his granddaughter, Desire. 
10. Petitioner's assertion that "Celia testified that she didn't know why [Decedent] didn't 
get his house back as planned" (emphasis added), App. Brief, p. 5, suggests that there 
was such a plan, but there is no reference to the record to support the existence of such "a 
plan," nor any known admissible evidence to support such a suggestion. 
11. The record cited, R. Vol. 1., p. 51, L1. 1-3; p. 86, L1. 4-10, does not support 
Petitioner's assertion that even after he quit-claimed the property, "[Decedent] believed 
he owned Richard's House outright ... [ or] that he was the sole owner ... ,", App. Brief, p. 
5. 
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12. Petitioner's assertion that Decedent told his "best friend" and his first ex-wife 
(Petitioner's mother Elizabeth Ortega) that he wanted Richard's House to go to his three 
biological children is of course inadmissible hearsay. Beyond that, these alleged 
statements were made at an unspecified time (not necessarily at the relevant time, i.e., the 
time of the transaction), Leandro Avila Aff., R. p. 51, para. 5; or several months after the 
deed was executed, Elizabeth Ortega Aff., R., p. 86, para. 4. They are also contradicted 
within Ms. Ortega's affidavit, id., para. 3. 
13. Mr. Avila's affidavit testimony, R. p. 51, LL. 4-5, cited by Petitioner, App. Brief, p. 
5, last paragraph, that "[Decedent] did not trust [Respondents]" must be based on 
inadmissible hearsay. In any event, it is an astonishing admission that in fact Decedent 
did not have a trusting relationship with them and thus an essential element of undue 
influence, a confidential relationship, is absent. 
14. The self-serving inventory filed by Petitioner does not necessarily support the 
assertion made by her that Richard's House was the primary asset ofthe Estate. App. 
Brief, p. 6, first para, Exhibit A. The value shown in the inventory is listed as "zero", as is 
the (negative) value of the encumbrance on it, the U.S. Bank loan. So far as appears of 
record, Decedent had no equity in Richard's House. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court could have granted the motion for summary judgment on 
alternative grounds. 
B. Respondents are claiming attorney fees on appeal pursuant to IAR Rule 41, Idaho 
Code Sections 12-121, and 15-8-208, and IRCP Rules II(a)(1) and 54(e) on the grounds 
as follows: 
1. Petitioner's appeal has been brought and/or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, 
and/or without foundation. 
2. It is not reasonable to conclude that to the best of Petitioner's attorney's 
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry that Petitioner's Notice of 
Appeal and Appellant's Brief are well grounded in fact and are warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that they are not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
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3. Petitioner has relied upon the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
(TEDRA), Idaho Code Section 15-8-101 et seq., to bring this action. R., pp. 31, 69. 
Petitioner has thus conceded that the attorney fee provision of that Act, Idaho Code 
Section 15-8-208, applies herein. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Whether the District Court erred in making inferences from disputed facts. 
The District Court did not make inferences from disputed facts. However, it did 
properly make inferences from undisputed facts and from the absence of facts. 
As the trier of fact, the District Court was entitled to draw the most probable 
inferences from undisputed facts. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P. 
2d 1272, 1275 (1991). Thus, for example, as to the first element of undue influence, "a 
person who is subject to influence", Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1,6-7,592 P. 2d 57, 
62-63 (1979), the district court considered the following undisputed evidence: 
[D] ecedent used separate property proceeds from the sale of a 
home in California he owned as separate property prior to his 
marriage to Celia [to purchase Richard's House]. 
Amended Petition to Set Aside Deeds2, paragraph 6, R., pp. 70. From this undisputed 
evidence, the District Court reasonably inferred that Decedent did in fact have knowledge 
about real estate transactions and was not therefore a person susceptible to undue 
influence. R., p. 102. There are no other facts to support a contrary finding, only unsworn 
conclusory statements not based on personal knowledge. 
B. Whether the district court erred in not considering all the evidence in the record. 
Petitioner apparently argues that since she contested the summary judgment, the 
district court was required to scour the record to find facts in her favor. This argument is 
not well founded. 
Petitioner cites Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 218 P. 3d 
1150(2009), because the District Court did, and notes that the applicable summary 
judgment in that case was not contested. Thus, Petitioner argues, the rule that "the district 
court was not required to search the record looking for evidence to create a genuine issue 
2 This is Petitioner's unverified amended petition. The District Court gave Petitioner the benefit of the 
doubt and considered the amended petition's unsworn allegations because they substantially mirrored 
Petitioner's original, superseded (verified) petition, R., p. 31 et seq. 
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of material fact", id., 218 P. 3d at 1164, only applies ifthe summary judgment is not 
contested. Such a limitation is not supported by the case law. Even the case cited by 
Vreeken for the rule, Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 
912, 188 P. 3d 854 (2008), involves a contested summary judgment: the attorney for 
Esser "also filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment," id., 188 P. 3d at 858. 
Petitioner says that "facts indicating fraud and undue influence were brought to 
the trial court's attention", and then lists those facts. App. Brief, p. 8. The sources of 
those facts in the record are not identified by Petitioner, nor does she specify which of the 
nine elements of fraud or the four elements of undue influence are supported by those 
facts. Additionally, Petitioner's purported facts are to varying degrees not compelling or 
not cognizable on summary judgment. Taking them one at a time (quoting from App. 
Brief, pp. 8-9): 
"1. The transactions at issue herein were part of a larger scheme. Four other properties 
were transferred at the same time to [Respondent] Acosta. Then, eight days later, 
[Respondent] Acosta transferred three ofthe properties back to his mother." 
(a) There is only one transaction at issue here, the deeding-over of 
Richard's House. As the District Court has correctly found, Petitioner has provided no 
support whatsoever for her claim on the El Paso Road property. Thus her reference to 
transaction~ is incorrect. 
(b) Petitioner says there is a "larger scheme," but has shed no light on what that 
scheme might be. 
"2. Celia had made several statements to [Decedent] regarding the purpose for signing the 
deeds." 
The only purported evidence in the record of any statement made by Celia to 
Decedent regarding the purpose for signing the relevant deed (to Richard's House) is 
inadmissible hearsay within hearsay: statements allegedly made by Celia to Decedent and 
restated by Decedent to Leandro Avila. Affidavit of Leandro Avila, para. 9, R. p. 51. The 
District Court could not properly consider such inadmissible hearsay evidence in 
deciding the summary judgment. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson 
Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,206 P. 3d 481, 487 (2009). 
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"3. [Decedent] was an older man, was uneducated, his occupation was as a trucker, and 
had been involved in two real estate transactions during this lifetime." 
As the District Court has found, the fact that Decedent had been involved in at 
least two real estate transactions supports an inference that he did in fact know about real 
estate transactions and therefore was not susceptible to undue influence. 
"4. Celia was in the business of buying and managing rental properties as a source of 
income." 
The record does not support that Celia was in that business. It is irrelevant 
anyway because her relative sophistication in real estate is not at issue. 
"5. The close relationships between Celia, [Respondent Acosta] and [Decedent]." 
(a) The only conflict in the evidence is created by Petitioner. On the one hand, 
Petitioner points to Respondent Acosta's testimony that he and Decedent were "close." 
Tr. Gilbert Acosta, p. 8, LL. 7-9. On the other hand, she points to evidence that Decedent 
"did not trust [Respondent Acosta]." See para. 14, below; Aff. of Leandro Avila, para. 6, 
R., p. 51. 
(b) While Celia was still married to Decedent at the time of the deed, they were 
separated albeit evidently they still had a relationship. Tr. Celia Ortega, p. 12, LL. 14-17. 
This does not necessarily support the conclusion that they were "close." 
"6. Celia was married to [Decedent] at the time the deeds were signed." 
True, but inconsequential. As the Trial Court has noted, Celia, a non-party in this 
action, did not benefit by the deeding of Decedent's property to Respondent Acosta. 
"7. Celia had the deeds prepared and she and [Respondent Acosta] took [Decedent] to the 
title office to sign them." 
The undisputed evidence is that the deed's were prepared at the title company. Tr. 
Celia Ortega, P. 21, LL. 4-10. 
"8. [Respondent Acosta] benefitted from the deeds." 
The only relevant deed is to Richard's House. The ultimate beneficiary of that 
deed is Decedent's granddaughter since Respondent Acosta re-deeded the property to 
Respondent Arizmendez, who is holding it in trust for the granddaughter. 
"9. Undisputed statements that [Decedent's] intent in signing the deeds was for the 
purpose of removing Celia's name from the property." 
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The undisputed evidence shows that Decedent's intent as to Richard's House, at 
the time he quit-claimed it, was to remove Celia's name and to place it with Respondent 
Acosta to be held in trust for Decedent's granddaughter. 
"10. Conflicting statements between Celia and her son, [Respondent Acosta], as to why 
Richard's house did not get transferred back to [Decedent]." 
There is no known conflict in these statements. Petitioner has not referenced 
anything in the record to support this assertion. 
"11. [Respondent Acosta's] failure to follow through on his claim of [Decedent's] intent 
in transferring Richard's house." 
It is undisputed that Respondent Acosta transferred Richard's House to 
Respondent Arizmendez where it is being held in trust for Decedent's granddaughter 
(Respondent Arizmendez's daughter). 
"12. Affidavit testimony that [Decedent] believed the house was still in his name." 
Decedent allegedly stated in the fall of2009 (he died in November of that year) 
that "[h]is plan was to sell his house in Idaho and then buy property in Arizona". Aff. of 
Elizabeth Ortega, R., p. 86. This would have been at least nine months after he had 
deeded-out Richard's House to Respondent Acosta. While such a statement, if 
admissible, might be deemed evidence that Decedent thought he still owned Richard's 
Home (which is not directly relevant to any issue on appeal), it is also inconsistent with 
Petitioner's assertion and Ms. Ortega's assertion in the very next paragraph of her 
affidavit that Decedent intended for Richard's House to go to her and her two siblings. 
Decedent allegedly told his "best friend," Leandro A vila, in "the weeks just prior 
to his death" that he wanted Richard's House "to go to [Petitioner], so that she could 
divide it between his three children." Aff. of Leandro Avila, R., p. 51. Again, if 
admissible and true, this might evidence some confusion on Decedent's part, some ten 
months after his quitclaim to Respondent Acosta. It is also inconsistent with his intent, as 
described by Ms. Ortega, supra, to sell the home so he could buy property in Arizona. 
To be clear, however, nowhere in the record is there evidence that Decedent ever 
expressly stated, after he quit-claimed the house, that he believed the house was still in 
his name. 
"13. [Decedent's] main asset was his home. The transfer left [Decedent] impoverished." 
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It is undisputed that Richard's House was (and is) encumbered by a US Bank 
debt. Nowhere in the record is there evidence as to the equity Decedent had in the house. 
Insofar as shown, his equity could have been zero or less. Therefore, deeding it out has 
not been shown to have impoverished Decedent. Significantly, and this is also 
undisputed, Decedent continued to reside in Richard's House until he died. Therefore, he 
was not deprived the use and occupancy of his home by quit-claiming it to Respondent 
Acosta. 
"14. Affidavit testimony that [Decedent] did not trust [Respondent Acosta]." 
This alleged lack of trust undercuts any suggestion that Respondent Acosta could 
have used his influence over Decedent to compel him to sign the deed. 
C. Whether the District Court erred in failing to recognize a presumption of undue 
influence. 
Petitioner cites McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho 313, 272 P. 2d 298 (1954) as 
authority for a presumption favoring a finding of undue influence in certain cases. 
Petitioner's analysis does not hold up under close scrutiny. 
As Petitioner characterizes McNabb, it is the confidential relationship between the 
grantor and grantee that is relevant. App. Brief, p. 9. Here the grantor is Decedent and his 
grantee is his stepson Respondent Acosta. Aside from unrefuted evidence that Decedent 
and Respondent Acosta were "close", there is no reason to infer a confidential 
relationship between them. Petitioner might have a stronger argument if the grantee was 
Decedent's (estranged) wife Celia, but she was not. (Decedent and Celia separated in 
1999 or 2000. Tr. Celia Ortega, p. 7, LL. 23-24.) Petitioner's argument is also undercut 
by her own affiant's statement that Decedent did not trust Respondent Acosta. Affidavit 
of Leandro Avila, para. 6, R., p. 51. 
However, assuming a confidential relationship does exist in this case sufficient to 
support a presumption of undue influence, Petitioner must also show that the grantee ( or 
at least someone other than grantor) "was instrumental in procuring the deed" before the 
presumption arises. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 575, 759 P. 2d 77,81 (Idaho App. 
1988). Here the undisputed evidence is that Decedent went to the title company with 
Celia and Respondent Acosta, where the deed was prepared and signed. Tr. Celia Ortega, 
p. 21. Further, it is undisputed that Decedent "asked [Celia] if we would put the house 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page-13 
under [Respondent Acosta's] name ... and [Respondent Acosta] said yes ... So, he 
transferred it into [Respondent Acosta's] name." Tr. Celia Ortega, p. 14, LL. 1-3. That 
testimony hardly supports a finding that anyone other than Decedent himself "procured 
the deed." 
Assuming however that both a confidential relationship between Decedent and the 
right person existed and that the right person "procured the deed", Petitioner still does not 
automatically prevail on her undue influence theory. The presumption would only get her 
so far: "the burden would simply shift to [Respondents] to come forward with evidence 
tending to disprove at least one of the four prime facie elements of undue influence," 
Krebs, supra, 114 Idaho at 575, 759 P. 2d at 81. 
Id. 
Those elements are as follows: 
(1) a grantor who is subject to influence; 
(2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; 
(3) a disposition to exert undue influence; and 
( 4) a result indicating undue influence. 
With regard to element (1), a grantor subject to influence, the following evidence 
is not disputed: 
1. Decedent was "alive and well and healthy" when the deed was signed. Tr. Celia 
Ortega,p. 17,LL. 15-19. 
2. Decedent had sold at least one property and purchased at least one other prior to the 
time of the deed. Aff. of Leandra A vila, para. 4, R., p. 50. 
3. Decedent had a definite idea of what he wanted done with his property: to get Celia's 
name off of the title and to have it held in trust for his granddaughter. Tr. Gilbert Acosta, 
pp. 15-16; p. 22, LL. 4-11; Affidavit of Efren Arizmendez, February 23, 2011, para. 5; 
Affidavit of Gilbert Acosta, Jr., February 23, 2011, para. 3; Affidavit of Celia A. Ortega, 
February 23,2011, para. 83. 
4. Decedent had requested that he be taken to the title company so that he could deed his 
property to Respondent Acosta. Affidavit of Gilbert Acosta, Jr., February 23, 2011. 
3 The affidavits of Arizmendez, Acosta, and Celia Ortega are part of Respondents' motion to augment the 
record and do not yet have assigned Record page numbers. 
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Clearly, therefore, Decedent had his own ideas of what he wanted done with his 
property, and some familiarity at least with real estate transactions. He was not one who 
would be reasonably viewed as susceptible to undue influence. 
The record is devoid of any admissible evidence to support either element (2) 
(opportunity to influence) or (3)(disposition to influence). 
With regard to element (4), a result indicating undue influence, Decedent has 
gotten what he intended: Celia's name off his property and the property being held in 
trust for his granddaughter. 
Thus Respondents have come forward with evidence tending to refute at least two 
of the four elements of undue influence, and there is simply no admissible evidence in the 
record to support the other two. Thus Respondents have met their burden under Krebs, 
supra, to overcome the presumption, and Petitioner does not get the benefit of any 
presumption of undue influence. Rather, Petitioner still bears the risk of nonpersuasion of 
all elements of her claim, which remains upon her throughout the trial. Id., 114 Idaho at 
575, 789, P. 2d at 81. As noted by the District Court, under controlling authority, 
Petitioner must be able to show that she can prove her undue influence "claim by 
evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing," R, p.97, citing Erb v. Kohnke, 121 
Idaho 328,824 P. 2d 903 (Ct. App. 1992). Even accepting as true all of Petitioner's 
admissible evidence, it is clear that she could not sustain such a burden going forward. 
Therefore, the District Court did not err in not giving Petitioner the benefit of a 
presumption of undue influence. 
D. Whether the District Court erred in not construing all disputed facts in favor of 
Petitioner, the non-moving party. 
Petitioner apparently argues, App. Brief, p. 12, that the intent of the Decedent in 
signing the deed is critical to determining whether it should be upheld. Further, that 
Decedent's intent is a question of fact and that there is conflicting evidence on that 
question. Therefore, Petitioner appears to argue, summary judgment was improper. 
The record does not support Petitioner's argument. 
Petitioner asserts that it is undisputed that Decedent's intent was to have Celia's 
name removed from his property. That mayor may not have been his intent or all of it 
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but there can be no dispute that deeding it to Respondent Acosta certainly got Celia's 
name off of it. 
Petitioner asserts that Celia testified that "the transfers" were done so that 
Respondent Acosta "could manage the properties". Petitioner appears to be deliberately 
conflating Celia's intent in transferring her own rental properties to Respondent Acosta 
with Decedent's intent in deeding his house to Respondent Acosta. They are different, as 
a fair reading of Celia's testimony shows. Tr. Celia Ortega, p. 10, L. 21-p. 14, L. 14; p. 
17, LL. 3-7. 
Petitioner asserts that two of her supporting affidavits show Decedent's intent was 
to pass his house to his three children. She is apparently referring to the affidavits of 
Leandro Avila, R., pp. 50-51; and Elizabeth Ortega, R., pp. 86-87. If these affidavits do 
in fact contain admissible evidence of Decedent's intent, they do not show his intent at 
the time of the deed. Mr. A vila states in his affidavit: 
On many occasions, including in the weeks just prior to his death, 
[Decedent] told me that he wanted the house he lived in to go to 
his daughter Danielle, so that she could divide it between his 
three children. 
R. 51, para. 5. Thus, there are scant foundational facts to support admissibility of these 
alleged statements. What is clear is that the alleged statements are not sworn to have been 
at the time of the deed, December 30,2008. Rather, they are placed over an indeterminate 
period of time ending up to "the weeks just prior to his death", which was on November 
13,2009, ten-and-halfmonths after the deed was signed, which is when Decedent was no 
longer the legal owner. 
Ms. Ortega states in her affidavit: 
I spoke to [Decedent] in the summer of2009 via 
telephone .... [Decedent]said that he wanted his house to go to his 
daughter, Danielle, because she would divide it evenly between 
his three children. 
Id., para. 4. This alleged statement was made months after Decedent signed his deed and 
is not evidence of his intent at the time of the deed. 
Since Petitioner has produced no evidence at all as to Decedent's intent at the 
time of the deed signing, there can be no conflict in the evidence of his intent at that time. 
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The only evidence in the record of his intent at the relevant time is that Decedent 
intended to get his estranged wife Celia's name off his property and to place it with 
Respondent Acosta to hold in trust for Decedent's granddaughter. The District Court 
certainly did not commit error by acting upon such undisputed evidence. 
E. Whether the District Court should be upheld on alternative grounds. 
1. Petitioner's proof of Decedent' s intent in quit-claiming his home is inadmissible 
hearsay and therefore cannot be considered on summary judgment. 
Petitioner's proof of what Decedent intended in quit -claiming his home is 
generally of the form "Decedent told Affiant" or "Decedent told a third-party who told 
Affiant." These are out of court statements allegedly made by Decedent offered for their 
truth, and therefore within the general prohibition against hearsay evidence. IRE Rules 
801 and 802. It does not appear that these statements are nonetheless admissible under 
any exception to the hearsay rule, including under IRE Rule 804, and Petitioner has made 
no showing that they are. 
Being inadmissible, such statements need not have been considered by the District 
Court in ruling on the summary judgment. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson 
Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,206 P. 3d 481, 487 (2009) (inadmissible evidence not 
cognizable on summary judgment). 
2. Petitioner has not presented any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to 
overcome the presumptive validity ofthe duly-executed deed. 
Idaho Code makes a deed conclusive as to the grantor's and the grantor's 
successor's interest in the property: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against everyone 
subsequently claiming under him ... 
Idaho Code Section 55-606 (inapplicable exception deleted). 
3. The Amended Petition is not verified and may be disregarded. 
Whereas the Petitioner's original Petition to Set Aside Deeds, R., pp. 31-40, is 
verified, the Amended Petition to Set Aside Deeds, R., pp. 69-76, is not. Therefore, the 
Amended Petition cannot be considered to have the same effect as an affidavit in 
summary judgment, even had it been couched in non-conclusory terms and had it stated 
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facts clearly within the personal knowledge of the Petitioner. Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 
878, 880-82, 693 P. 2d 1080, 1082-84(Ct. App. 1984). 
4. The Petitioner's allegations of fact are incomplete, conclusory, self-contradictory, and 
appear not to be based on admissible evidence. 
a. The elements of fraudulent transfer claim are not shown. 
The closest the Petitioner comes to setting forth any specific facts to support her 
fraud claim is in the unsworn Amended Petition, Second Cause of Action, R., pp. 73-75, 
in which she asserts, in conclusory fashion only, certain facts presumably meant to cover 
the nine elements of fraud. These are set out in paragraphs 31-37 of the Amended 
Petition. 
The Petitioner's allegations are internally inconsistent. For example, the Petitioner 
asserts that "Celia stated the deeds were given to [Respondent Acosta] to avoid 
creditors", id., para. 16. The Petitioner presents no evidence to show that that objective 
was not accomplished by quitclaiming the property, i.e., that Celia's representation was 
false. Celia in any event is not a party in this action. 
One essential element of a fraud claim is damages. Petitioner's factual allegation 
with regard to the damages element is that she "has been damaged as a result of Celia 
Ortega's misrepresentations because she will not inherit her share of decedent's estate if 
the quitclaim deeds are given effect", id., para. 37. Damage to Decedent is not alleged, 
and the Petitioner's "damages" arise only from an expectancy of an inheritance. The 
District Court has ruled that Petitioner has made no claim based on an interference with 
expectancy of inheritance, Mem. Dec. and Order on Rule 12(b) Motion, R., pp. 79-83, 
81; and therefore the Petitioner could have suffered no damages based on such a theory. 
Petitioner has not identified anything relating to that ruling as an issue on appeal. 
Finally, the Petitioner alleges that she only became aware after the fact of the 
fraudulent conduct alleged to have occurred starting in 1985 through November, 2009: 
"Petitioner discovered Celia Ortega's fraudulent conduct within the last year", Amended 
Petitioner, para. 38, R., p. 74. In other words, she has no personal knowledge of it, 
including particularly what transpired around the execution of the quitclaims in 
December, 2008. Further, she has presented no potentially admissible evidence as to 
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those events beyond Decedent's ex-wife's (her mother's) affidavit opposing the summary 
judgment. Elizabeth Ortega affidavit, R., pp. 86-87. 
b. The elements of undue influence claim are not shown. 
The only arguably relevant evidence proferred by the Petitioner in her summary 
judgment papers supporting the "result" element of her undue influence theory is in the 
affidavit of Elizabeth Ortega, Decedent's ex-wife, R., pp. 86-87. Ms. Ortega testified 
that: 
1. In the fall of 2009 (which would have been nearly a year after the deeds were 
executed), Decedent expressed "[h]is plan ... to sell his house in Idaho and then buy 
property in Arizona". 
2. In the summer of2009 (which would have been a half year after the deeds were 
executed) Decedent said "he wanted his house to go to [Petitioner], because she would 
divide it evenly between his three children." 
3. Just before Halloween, 2008, Decedent "said that Celia was bringing papers to 
him to sign to get her name off his house to protect it from creditors." 
Two of these three statements are after the relevant time, which is when the 
quitclaims were executed (December 30, 2008). The third is not inconsistent with the 
result achieved by quitclaiming Richard's House to Decedent's step-son, Respondent 
Acosta. 
However, the "result" element of undue influence, as presented in the Petitioner's 
briefing, relates to Decedent's alleged "intent to pass his house to his three children." Her 
theory is that Decedent's intended result of having Richard's House go to his three 
children was not achieved because the result is that it has gone to Respondent Acosta. If 
that is the "result" element, as the Petitioner has asserted, then she was required to 
present admissible evidence in the District Court showing the other three elements of 
undue influence in relation to that "result" element. She did not do so. 
The rule the Petitioner asks the court to adopt boils down to this: Any time there 
is some evidence of a decedent's verbal expression of intent as to the disposition of his or 
her property, any deed resulting in a disposition contrary to that expression must be set 
aside. 
5. The EI Paso Road property not at issue. 
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The Petitioner has claimed an interest in two properties, Richard's House and the 
EI Paso Road property. She has prayed for voiding ofthe Richard's House deed to place 
full title in the Estate. She has prayed for voiding the EI Paso Road deed to give the 
Estate a one-half undivided interest along with Celia. Amended Petition, R., pp. 75-76. 
However, Petitioner did not address the EI Paso Road property in her summary 
judgment papers or on this appeal. Respondents are therefore clearly entitled to summary 
judgment as to that property, quieting title in Respondent Acosta, as the District Court 
found. R., p. 98(second paragraph). 
6. The Petitioner is not entitled to "damages according to proof." 
The Petitioner had been persistent in asserting an entitlement to "damages 
according to proof'. Amended Petition, R., p. 75. Second Cause of Action, para. 1. This 
claim was dismissed on Respondents' Rule 12(b) motion. Mem. Dec. and Order on Rule 
12(b) Motion, R., p. 82, para. 1. It appears that she is not appealing that ruling since it is 
not listed as an issue on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully request that the Final Judgment and Order Dismissing 
Amended Petition to Set Aside Deeds entered by the District Court on April 12, 2011, be 
affirmed on this appeal and that, consequently, Petitioner's appeal be denied. Further, 
Respondents pray for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and their costs on the 
grounds stated hereinabove. 
Respectfully submitted this __ day of __________ , 20_. 
James M. Runsvold 
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